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Abstract
In the paper we examine the problem of exploitation of a common renewable resource. We use two
kinds of models of this problem: games with finitely many players and games with a continuum of players.
Equilibria in both cases are calculated and the payoffs are compared with payoffs in the situation in which
each player behaves as a single owner of the resource. Various concepts of optimality are considered:
optimality in the sense of property, Pareto optimality, maximization of a social welfare function of specific
type and environmental sustainability. Another issue is the problem of enforcement of assumed profiles
by so-called “linear” tax systems. Special attention is paid to the comparison of games with finitely many
players and their continuum-of-players limit game.
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1. Introduction
The paper is devoted to modelling exploitation of a common renewable resource by large
groups of agents. A special focus is given to the problem of an environmental taxation system
enforcing a profile being a Pareto improvement of the equilibrium solution or at least fulfilling
some environmental or social conditions.
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players and games with a continuum of players.
In both games the measure of the space of players is normalized in order that the results
obtained for both models could be compared.
In these games, the state of the system X, describing the amount of the available resource,
changes in response to the aggregate UΔ of a profile Δ (which will be formally defined in the
sequel) of players’ strategies and the behaviour of the system is described by the regeneration
equation X′(t) = rX(t)−UΔ(t,X(t)) with the initial condition X(0) = x¯ > 0 (note that for this
regeneration equation it is impossible to completely destroy the system at any finite time, i.e.,
X(t) is always positive, whatever Δ the players choose).
There is a constraint on players’ strategies available at state x.
The payoff of each player is the integral over an infinite time interval of his discounted instan-
taneous payoffs.
The full specification of the model is in Section 2.
There is a large number of game-theoretic models describing exploitation of common renew-
able resources, started by Levhari and Mirman [8], continued by, e.g., Fisher and Mirman [5] or
papers in the volume edited by Carraro and Filar [4]. Most of them examine two player games.
For a more exhaustive reviews of such models see, e.g., Kaitala [6], or the author [17] and [22].
The games considered in this paper are good to model situations like exploitation of high seas
fisheries. Similar models can be used to describe emission of greenhouse gases or freones. The
number of players increasing to reach the continuum as the limit case does not reflect situations in
which additional fishermen appear and join the existing set of players. In our models all measures
on sets of players are normed, and maximal available aggregates are the same in all games, and
therefore joint influence of the players on the ecosystem is preserved.
Here by increasing the number of players we consider not additional players, but a more accu-
rate way to describe their behaviour: in each game we, in fact, have the same mass of fishermen
but we look at the processes of decision making as more or less centralized.
To illustrate the gradual process of decentralization reflected by increasing the number of
players, we start by setting the number of players equal to 1 (in general—mankind as one deci-
sion maker, in the case of high seas fisheries—all independent ships treated as one fleet with one
leader), then we realize that decisions are not made by the abstract “mankind,” but the number of
decision makers is at least two, still abstract (e.g., North and South, better or worse equipped fish-
ing fleets). We can decompose the model further, into continents, countries, regions. The number
of players increases as we realize that the decision making processes are more decentralized.
Finally we get to the actual decision makers (if we consider, e.g., emission of greenhouse
gases—executives in firms or even owners of small fireplaces, while in the case of fishery—
captains or owners of ships). The number of such small players is large enough to make any
single player feel insignificant—negligible. A captain of a ship does not think that his decision
can influence the dynamics of the fishery and therefore behaves in a myopic way. This is not
quite irrational—he is approximately right, since his influence is negligibly small. Although the
players are right only approximately, their beliefs influence their decision processes. Obviously,
aggregate decisions influence the dynamics of the fishery—they define it. This is also known to
everyone.
We can say that players either are irrational in their decision-making processes or that they
just constitute a continuum.
The best framework to deal with interactions among many players in which we have simulta-
neously negligibility of single players and meaningful aggregates, are games with a continuum
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of a single player while “sufficiently many” players are not negligible. Games with a continuum
of players (continuing the idea of Aumann [1,2] and Vind [11] concerning markets with contin-
uum of traders) were defined by Schmeidler [10] and afterwards examined in many papers (e.g.,
by Mas-Colell [9], Balder [3], Wieczorek [12] and [13], Wieczorek and Wiszniewska [14] and
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [16]).
Dynamic games with a continuum of players were not considered for a long time. A gen-
eral theory of such games was developed by the author in [19,20,23] and [21] (with some
applications). There were also applications of such games: on modelling various markets
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [21,25,27–29] and Karatzas, Shubik and Sudderth [7], modelling elec-
tions Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [20], and especially important from the point of view of this paper
modelling exploitation of common ecosystems Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [18] and [15] with fo-
cus also on mechanisms enforcing optimality.
When we compare a dynamic game with a continuum of players with its counterpart with
finitely many players, we can expect a substantial change in equilibria but also some asymptotic
behaviour as the number of players tends to infinity. In [24] the author examined a discrete
time dynamic game with a continuum of players and its counterpart with finitely many players in
which players were able to destroy the system at any stage of the game (which was represented by
X(t) = 0). The extraction rates in constant rate symmetric equilibria of finite player games tended
to the extraction rate of a symmetric constant rate equilibrium in the continuum-of-players game.
Nevertheless, there was a substantial difference: in games with finitely many players the system
was not destroyed in dynamic equilibria—X(t) was always positive—while for the game with a
continuum of players no profile with this property was an equilibrium. This is not the case in this
paper: the players are unable to destroy the system at any finite time and at equilibrium players
can have the same extraction rates in both finite and continuum of players games. Nevertheless,
even in such a case the technique of calculating equilibria as well as means enforcing socially
desired profiles essentially changes. Moreover, it is much simpler in the case of a continuum of
players.
Another interesting issue in ecological problems, which may constitute a continuation of this
paper, seems ecological education which influences players expectations about the future state
of the ecosystem, and, especially, perception of their own influence on the ecosystem. In [26]
the author introduced the notion of belief-distorted Nash equilibrium together with the concept
of self-verification, and a discrete time dynamic game of exploitation of a common ecosystem,
similar to that considered in this paper, was an example for the operation of this new notion in
both a continuum and finitely many players games.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2 both games are formulated: with n players
and with a continuum of players (denoted by ∞). Equilibria are calculated for games without
enforcement in Section 3 and their suboptimality is proven in Section 4. The problem of choice
of socially desired behaviour is examined in detail in Section 5, while the problem of enforcement
is considered in Section 6.
2. Formulation of the model
In order to make the games comparable, we consider sets of players Ωi (where i = n for n-
player games and i = ∞ for the continuum-of-players game) as subsets of the unit interval [0,1].
The measure on the set of players Ωn is normed and uniform (i.e., μn(ω) = 1n for ω ∈ Ωn). The
measure on Ω∞ = [0,1], denoted by μ∞, is the Lebesgue measure on [0,1].
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sub-intervals Ik such that all players from Ik are identical, i.e., all parameters defining players
(listed below—with subscript ω) are identical for players from the same Ik . The type index will
be always denoted as a superscript. The set of players of type k in the i-player game (with i
positive integer or infinity) is assumed to be measurable and its measure will be denoted by μki .
We assume that μkn → μk∞ as n tends to infinity.
In both games the set of static strategies is R+, the set of decisions available to the players is
generally also R+, but at state x, player ω can choose only decisions from the set of decisions
available at x which is equal to [0,Mω · x] (where Mω are assumed to be large). For players of
type k we have Mω = Mk .
The game is played in a system with the set of possible states R+ and the initial state is x¯ > 0.
A (dynamic) strategy of player ω is any Lebesgue-measurable function D :R+ × R+ → R+
which is Lipschitz in the second argument (state of the resource) with a constant L (without loss
of generality the same for all types of players) and such that for all t and x, D(t, x) Mω · x.
The first argument represents time, the second—the state of the system and the condition means
that D(t, x) is in the set of decisions available at x.
A dynamic profile Δ is a measurable function from the product of the sets of players, time and
states into the set of static strategies Δ :Ωi ×R+ ×R+ → R+, which will be written as Δω(t, x),
such that for a.e. player ω Δω(·,·) is a dynamic strategy of player ω. The aggregate UΔ :R+ ×
R+ → R+ of a profile Δ is defined by UΔ(t, x) =
∫
Ωi
Δω(t, x) dμ(ω) (which in the case of
finitely many players is the average).
The form of players’ strategies allows for arbitrary measurable dependence on state and time.
However, we sometimes also assume that players restrict only to fixed rate strategies (i.e., such
that Δω(t, x) = cω · x). We shall prove that there exist profiles of such form which are equilibria
over the whole class of dynamic profiles as well as profiles of such form which are Pareto optimal
over the whole class of dynamic profiles. In some aspects, for simplicity of further reasoning, we
shall restrict our attention only to fixed rate profiles.
The time set is [0,+∞), and during the game the state of the system changes in response to
the aggregate UΔ of players’ strategies profile Δ according to the regeneration equation X′(t) =
rX(t) − UΔ(t,X(t)) with the initial condition X(0) = x¯. The trajectory corresponding to any
profile of the aggregate UΔ (such an absolutely continuous trajectory exists and is unique since
UΔ is measurable and bounded and Lipschitz with respect to the state variable as the average of
functions which are Lipschitz with the constant L) will be denoted by XUΔ .
The usual form of the profile is of extended closed loop type, but we shall also need an open
loop form of profiles: for a profile Δ, the open loop form of Δ is a function ΔOL such that
ΔOLω (t) = Δω(t,XUΔ(t)) for all t and ω.
The instantaneous payoff for a decision d is lnd (for simplicity of notation we take
ln 0 = −∞).
The logarithmic instantaneous payoff function is used, as in, e.g., Levhari and Mirman [8] or
Fisher and Mirman [5], in order to emphasize the fact that the resource considered is the basis
of the existence of the society of their users—the loss of utility resulting from not extracting at
all for even a very short period cannot be compensated by any, arbitrarily large extraction levels
over the rest of the time interval.
The payoff for a dynamic profile Δ is equal to the instantaneous payoff discounted and inte-
grated over time:
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+∞∫
0
e−ξωt ln
(
ΔOLω (t)
)
dλ(t),
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on R+, and ξω > 0 is the discount rate of player ω,
while ξk—of type k (ξω = ξk whenever player ω is of type k).
We assume that ξω are small compared to Mω, i.e., maxω∈Ωi ξω  minω∈Ωi Mω.
3. Equilibria
The most important notion in a noncooperative game is equilibrium. We shall consider a Nash
equilibrium. Here we give a definition of Nash equilibrium valid both for games with n and a
continuum of players.
Definition 1. A dynamic profile Δ is a Nash equilibrium in the game with i players if for a.e.
ω ∈ Ωi and every dynamic strategy D of player ω we have Πω(Δω,UΔ)  Πω(D,UΔD,ω),
where ΔD,ω is a profile defined by the condition for all t and x ΔD,ωω (t, x) = D(t, x) and
ΔD,ων (t, x) = Δν(t, x) for all ν = ω.
Let us note that in the case of games with finitely many players this definition is equivalent to
the standard definition of Nash equilibrium, since the measure of each player is greater than 0.
Theorem 1. There exists a dynamic equilibrium Δ in the n-player game such that for players
of type k we have Δω(x, t) = ckn · x for all t and x, where ckn = min(ξk · n,Mk). It is the only
constant rate profile being an equilibrium.
Theorem 2. For games with a continuum of players there exists a dynamic equilibrium Δ such
that for Δω(x, t) = ck∞ · x for every player ω of type k, for all k, t and x, where ck∞ = Mk . It is
the only equilibrium (up to t and ω in a negligible set).
The symbol ck∞ instead of Mk is used for uniformity of notation.
Note that ckn  ck∞ and ckn → ck∞ as n tends to infinity. Therefore, in this example, the game
with a continuum of players can be regarded as a good approximation of situation with many
(but finitely many players). For large n we have ckn = ck∞ = Mk , and therefore the equilibria in
n-players games are the same as in the continuum of players game (unlike in the discrete time
games from [24]). However, the mechanism of calculating these equilibria essentially differs (see
the proofs).
In order to prove Theorem 1, we shall need the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Let us consider the n-player game and the best response of player ω of type k to some
strategies of the remaining players. Assume that the sum of decisions of the remaining players
weighted by their measures at any time is of the form C · x for every state x and a.e. time t .
Then there exists a best response of player ω given by D(t, x) = ckn · x for ckn = min(ξk · n,Mk).
This best response is unique up to t in a negligible set if we consider open-loop forms of players’
strategies.
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∫ +∞
0 e
−ξωt ln(D(t,XD,C(t))) dλ(t) with
the constraint D(t,XD,C(t))Mk ·XD,C(t), where XD,C is a trajectory of the system given by
the equation
X′(t) = r · X(t) − 1
n
· D(t,X(t))− C · X(t)
with the initial condition X(0) = x¯.
This is equivalent to
X′(t) = (r − C) · X(t) − 1
n
· D(t,X(t)).
First, we shall find an optimal solution over a smaller set of available strategies of player ω:
constant rate strategies D(t, x) = s · x.
On this class of control functions, for rate s the behaviour equation has the form X′(t) =
(r − C − 1
n
· s) · X(t), which leads to the trajectory X(t) = x¯ · e(r−C− 1n ·s)·t .
Therefore, the related payoff is
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
s · x¯ · e(r−C− 1n ·s)·t)dλ(t) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t
(
ln s + ln x¯ +
(
r − C − 1
n
· s
)
· t
)
dt
= ln s + ln x¯
ξω
+ (r − C −
1
n
· s)
(ξω)2
.
The first order condition for optimal s is
1
s · ξω −
1
n · (ξω)2 = 0,
which implies s = n · ξω. The payoff function is obviously concave, therefore, if the first order
conditions are fulfilled for n · ξω Mω, then this point is the unique maximum. In the opposite
case, the maximum is obtained at Mω. These two conditions give us ckn.
Now let us substitute the obtained rate ckn into the payoff function. We get a function V of the
initial state being the optimal payoff over the constrained class of control functions
V (x) = ln c
k
n + lnx
ξω
+ (r − C −
1
n
· ckn)
(ξω)2
.
Note that V is continuously differentiable for x > 0, while x = 0 cannot be reached from any
positive initial condition. Therefore, in order to check whether ckn · x defines a control which is
globally optimal it is enough to check whether V fulfills the Bellman equation with transversality
condition at infinity (for sufficiency of such a condition see, e.g., Zabczyk [30] or [31]). In our
case:
ξω · V (x) = sup
0dMω·x
(
ln(d) + V ′(x) ·
(
(r − C) · x − d
n
))
,
which is obviously fulfilled and the supremum at the right-hand side of the equation is obtained
for d = ckn · x.
The transversality condition is limt→+∞ V (X(t)) · e−ξω ·t = 0 for the trajectory corresponding
to this choice of player ω, which is also fulfilled.
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players which has constant rate average.
To prove the uniqueness we first assume that there exists another optimal control function D̂
whose open-loop form D̂OL differs from the open-loop form DOL of D on a nonnegligible set.
Let us denote the optimal payoff by πopt.
We consider a control function D˜ with the open loop form fulfilling
D˜OL = 1
2
DOL + 1
2
D̂OL.
Because of the concavity of the logarithm, we get
ln
(
D˜
(
t,XD˜,C(t)
))
>
1
2
ln
(
D
(
t,XD,C(t)
))+ 1
2
ln
(
D̂
(
t,XD̂,C(t)
))
,
i.e.,
ln
(
D˜OL(t)
)
>
1
2
ln
(
DOL(t)
)+ 1
2
ln
(
D̂OL(t)
)
.
Since this strict inequality is on a nonnegligible set and outside this set we have equality, then
the payoff for D˜ fulfills
+∞∫
0
e−ξωt ln
(
D˜OL(t)
)
dλ(t) >
+∞∫
0
e−ξωt
(
1
2
ln
(
DOL(t)
)+ 1
2
ln
(
D̂OL(t)
))
dλ(t)
= 1
2
πopt + 1
2
πopt,
which contradicts the optimality of D or D̂. 
Proof of Theorem 1. It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3. 
Proof of Theorem 2. In this paper we can use one of so-called decomposition theorems concern-
ing dynamic games with continuum of players with state of the system changing in response to
a statistic of a profile (a generalization of usual aggregate—an integral of a measurable function
composed with the graph of the profile): such decomposition theorems for games with contin-
uous time are in Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [15,18] and [19] but only for open loop strategies,
while for strategies defined as a function of time and state we have a compound Theorem 1 of
Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [23] concerning stochastic games (here cited as Theorem 14 in Appen-
dix A).
Using this theorem for our simple game we get two results:
(1) (from (b) of cited theorem) every dynamic profile consisting of equilibria in static games is
a dynamic equilibrium;
(2) (from (f)) every dynamic equilibrium consists of equilibria in static games.
In every static game at fixed time t and state x with x > 0 we have only one equilibrium (up
to ω in a negligible set)—each player extracts all: Mω · x, since for every player ω his only best
response to any profile of decisions of the remaining players is given by Arg maxdMω·x lnd ={Mω · x}. 
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Nash equilibria are usually not Pareto optimal. We have such a situation in this paper. In the
case of identical players it is easy to indicate a Pareto optimal profile, which is better for all
players—this is the profile in which all players behave as if each of them were the only user of
the ecosystem.
Theorem 4. If 2 n+∞ and all players are identical, then a profile Δ˜ defined by Δ˜ω(t, x) =
c11 · x is better for every player then the equilibrium profile Δω(t, x) = c1i · x. Moreover, Δ˜ is
Pareto optimal and maximizes the aggregate payoff ∫
Ωi
Πω(Δω,UΔ)dμi(ω).
Proof. First we shall consider games with finitely many players. Let us calculate payoffs for
both profiles:
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
ξ1 · e(r−ξ1)·t · x¯)dt
= ln ξ
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − ξ
1
(ξ1)2
.
Now we shall calculate the payoff for the equilibrium profile assuming that n · ξ1 M1:
Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
n · ξ1 · e(r−n·ξ1)·t)dt
= lnn
ξ1
+ ln ξ
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − n · ξ
1
(ξ1)2
= lnn
ξ1
+ ln ξ
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − ξ
1
(ξ1)2
− (n − 1) · ξ
1
(ξ1)2
.
Therefore, we have
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
(n − 1) − lnn
ξ1
> 0 for n > 1.
If n · ξ1 > M1, then
Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
M1 · e(r−M1)·t · x¯)dt
= lnM
1
ξ1
+ r − M
1
(ξ1)2
+ ln x¯
ξ1
=
ln(M1
ξ1
)
ξ1
+ ln ξ
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − ξ
1
(ξ1)2
−
(M
1
ξ1
− 1) · ξ1
(ξ1)2
.
Therefore, we have
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
(M
1
ξ1
− 1) − ln(M1
ξ1
)
ξ1
> 0
since, by the assumption, (M11 ) > 1.ξ
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Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
M1 · e(r−M1)·t · x¯)dt
= lnM
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − M
1
(ξ1)2
=
ln(M1
ξ1
)
ξ1
+ ln ξ
1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − ξ
1
(ξ1)2
−
(M
1
ξ1
− 1) · ξ1
(ξ1)2
,
therefore also
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ) > 0.
Now we shall prove that Δ˜ maximizes the aggregate payoff:
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)

∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
for every profile Δ.
We have the following equality:
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
=
+∞∫
0
∫
Ωi
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dμi(ω)dλ(t)
(for finitely many players this fact is obvious, for a continuum of players it follows from the
Fubini theorem).
By the Jensen inequality,
+∞∫
0
∫
Ωi
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dμi(ω)dλ(t)

+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(∫
Ωi
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
)
dμi(ω)
)
dλ(t)
=
+∞∫
e−ξ1·t ln
(
UΔ
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t)0
A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 337 (2008) 840–861 849
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
ξ1 · e(r−ξ1)·t · x¯)dλ(t) = Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜),
which ends the proof that Δ˜ maximizes the aggregate payoff.
Since Δ˜ maximizes the aggregate payoff, it has to be Pareto optimal: if it were not, then the
aggregated payoff of a Pareto improvement of Δ˜ would be greater than for Δ˜. 
If the players are not identical, the profile Δ˜ does not have to be a Pareto improvement of the
equilibrium profile. Nevertheless, it sometimes is:
Theorem 5.
(a) If n is large enough and for all types n ·ξk Mk , then a profile Δ˜ defined by Δ˜ω(t, x) = ck1 ·x
is better for every player than the equilibrium profile defined by Δω(t, x) = ckn · x for ω of
type k.
(b) Let us take any positive integer l > 1. If
max
k=1,...,K
ξk  l − 1
ln l
· min
k=1,...,K ξ
k,
then for all n  l such that for all types n · ξk Mk a profile Δ˜ is better for every player
then the equilibrium profile Δω(t, x).
(c) The profile Δ˜ is always better for at least one type of players than Δ.
Proof. Let us calculate payoffs for both profiles:
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξk ·t ln
(
ξk · e(r−ξ¯ )·t · x¯)dt
= ln ξ
k
ξk
+ ln x¯
ξ k
+ r − ξ¯
(ξ k)2
(where ξ¯ denotes the average discount rate ξ¯ =∑Ki=1 ξ iμin).
Now we shall calculate the payoff for the equilibrium profile assuming that n · ξk Mk for
every type k,
Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξk ·t ln
(
n · ξk · e(r−n·ξ¯ )·t · x¯)dt
= lnn
ξk
+ ln ξ
k
ξk
+ ln x¯
ξ k
+ r − n · ξ¯
(ξ k)2
= lnn
ξk
+ ln ξ
k
ξk
+ r − ξ¯
(ξ k)2
− (n − 1) · ξ¯
(ξ k)2
.
Therefore, we have
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ) = −
lnn
ξk
+ (n − 1) · ξ¯
(ξ k)2
=
(n − 1) · ξ¯
ξ k
· ξk
(ξk)2
− lnn
ξk
=
(n − 1) · ξ¯
ξ k
· ξk
k 2 −
lnn
k
=
(n − 1) · ξ¯
ξ k
k
− lnn
k
.(ξ ) ξ ξ ξ
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ξ k
> lnn. We have this inequality for every n and
for every type k of players who are not more impatient than the average (then ξ¯
ξ k
 1).
(a) The function lnn
n−1 is strictly decreasing and it tends to 0. Therefore for every positive value
of mink=1,...,K ξ¯ξk there exists N such that for n > N we have
lnn
n−1 < mink=1,...,K
ξ¯
ξk
, which
means that the profile Δ˜ is better for every player than Δ.
(b) Since the function (n − 1) · ξ¯
ξ k
− lnn is strictly increasing for every fixed value of the
ratio ξ¯
ξ k
, we can check for which value of this ratio the function is positive for all n  l: we
substitute l for n. We get (l − 1) · ξ¯
ξ k
− ln l > 0, which implies ξ¯
ξ k
> ln l
l−1 . This holds for every
distribution of types whenever
max
k=1,...,K
ξk  l − 1
ln l
· min
k=1,...,K ξ
k.
(c) In any case there exists a type k such that ξk  ξ¯ . As we have proven, for players of this
type we always have Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ) > 0. 
Theorem 6. If for all k either cki are sufficiently large compared to ξk and sufficiently close to
c¯i =∑Kl=1 cliμli ; or both cki and ξk are sufficiently close to c¯i and ξ¯i =∑Kl=1 ξ lμli , respectively,
then in the game with i players the profile Δ˜ is a Pareto improvement of the equilibrium profile Δ.
Proof. We compare the payoffs for these two profiles:
We have
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξω·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t)
=
+∞∫
0
e−ξk ·t ln
(
ξk · e(r−ξ¯i )·t · x¯)dt = ln ξk
ξk
+ ln x¯
ξ k
+ r − ξ¯i
(ξ k)2
,
Πω(Δω,UΔ) =
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
cki · e(r−c¯i )·t · x¯
)
dt = ln c
k
i
ξ k
+ ln x¯
ξ k
+ r − c¯i
(ξ k)2
.
We compare the payoffs and get
Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) − Πω(Δω,UΔ)
=
(
ln ξk
ξk
+ r − ξ¯i
(ξ k)2
)
−
( ln( cki
ξk
)
ξ k
+ ln ξ
k
ξk
+ r − ξ¯i
(ξ k)2
−
(
c¯i
ξk
− ξ¯i
ξ k
) · ξk
(ξk)2
)
= −
ln( c
k
i
ξk
)
ξ k
+
(
c¯i
ξk
− ξ¯i
ξ k
)
ξ k
.
The profile Δ˜ is a Pareto improvement of Δ if and only if
ln( c
k
i
ξk
)
k

(
c¯i
ξk
− ξ¯i
ξ k
) · ξk
k 2 .ξ (ξ )
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ln
(
cki
ξ k
)
 c¯i − ξ¯i
ξ k
= c¯i − c
k
i
ξ k
+ c
k
i − ξk
ξk
+ ξ
k − ξ¯i
ξ k
,
i.e.,
cki − ξk
ξk
− ln
(
cki
ξ k
)
+ c¯i − c
k
i
ξ k
+ ξ
k − ξ¯i
ξ k
 0.
We know that ( c
k
i
ξk
− 1) − ln( cki
ξk
) is always positive for cki  ξk and it is increasing in
cki
ξk
, and it
tends to infinity while c
k
i
ξk
tends to infinity. Whenever all cki are large compared to ξk and close to
each other, or both cki and ξk are close to their means we have the required inequality. 
Theorem 7. If the game is with n players such that for all k we have n · ξk Mk or the game
is with a continuum of players, and either all Mk are sufficiently large compared to ξk and suffi-
ciently close to Mi =∑Kl=1 Mlμli ; or both all Mk and ξk are close to Mi and ξ¯i =∑Kl=1 ξ lμli ,
respectively, then in the game with i players the profile Δ˜ is a Pareto improvement of the equi-
librium profile Δ.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Theorem 6. 
5. Social optimality
There are at least three possible ways of looking for socially optimal profiles: making every
player behave as a single decision maker—sole owner of the resource, maximizing certain social
welfare function (e.g., the aggregate payoff) and enforcing the optimal profile, or creating a
possibility to cooperate.
In this paper we shall concentrate on the first two ways.
We can expect that if all players are identical, both solution concepts will lead to the same
results.
5.1. Privatization
First we shall consider an abstract procedure of privatization.
In this procedure we distribute the resource to the players, proportionally to their measures
and make each player the only owner of his part of the ecosystem. We assume that all external-
ities, both negative and positive are excluded. Formally, in this approach each player solves the
dynamic optimization problem: find a dynamic strategy D maximizing Πω(D,D).
In such a situation instead of the i-player game we have i independent decision making prob-
lems.
The procedure of privatization is usually possible only theoretically, since it is impossible to
prevent fish from migrating or keep pollutant only over the factory which emitted it.
However, private property is usually regarded as ideal. Therefore obtaining by an actual pro-
cedure results which are at least as good as they might be if the private property were really
introduced seems a good notion of effectiveness.
Definition 2. A profile Δ is effective in the sense of property if for a.e. ω,
Πω(Δω,UΔ)Πω(D,D)
for every strategy D of player ω.
852 A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 337 (2008) 840–861What we can expect, is that we can obtain payoffs which are exactly as good as the best payoff
in the case of private property, but a situation in which some players obtain greater payoffs after
introduction of a tax system seems counterintuitive. However, a similar concept of effectiveness
was first introduced in Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [15] and [18], where tax-subsidy systems were
considered. In those papers it was possible to obtain profiles which were not only effective in the
sense of property but also yielded after tax-subsidy payoffs even greater than maximal payoff
after privatization.
Proposition 8.
(a) If all players are identical, then the profile Δ˜ is effective in the sense of property.
(b) The equilibrium profile Δ is not effective in the sense of property.
Proof. The proof is identical for finite and infinite number of players—i.
(a) Πω(D,D) is maximized by the strategy D(t, x) = c11 · x, which is the strategy assigned to
each player if the profile Δ˜ is chosen.
(b) If all types of players have identical cki , then it is implied by the fact that Πω(Δ˜ω,UΔ˜) =
Πω(Δ˜ω, Δ˜ω) is greater than Πω(Δω,UΔ) = Πω(Δω,Δω) for all players.
If this is not true, then there exists a type k of players—therefore a set of players of positive
measure—such that cki <
∑K
l=1 cli · μli . For each player ω of this type k we have Πω(Δω,Δω) >
Πω(Δω,UΔ), since the trajectory corresponding to Δω is for all t > 0 greater than the trajectory
corresponding to UΔ. 
In the case of more than one type of players, the profile Δ˜ does not have to be effective in the
sense of property for games with number of players greater than or equal to 2.
5.2. Social welfare approach
In the social welfare approach we have an additional decision maker, called social planner,
whose aim is to maximize so-called social welfare function—a function reflecting well being of
all players. The social welfare approach is very controversial since taking different social welfare
function may lead to different results.
If all players are identical (K = 1), the obvious form of the social welfare function is the
aggregated payoff, i.e.,
AP(Δ) =
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω).
As we can expect, the profile Δ˜ is the only profile (up to the equivalence of open loop forms
almost everywhere) maximizing the social welfare function:
Proposition 9. If K = 1, then for every number of players i the profile Δ˜ maximizes AP and if
there is another profile Δ maximizing AP, then for a.e. ω, for a.e. t we have Δ˜OLω (t) = ΔOLω (t).
Proof. In fact we have already proven that the profile Δ˜ maximizes AP in Theorem 4. So it is
enough to prove the uniqueness up to equivalence almost everywhere of their open loop forms.
Assume that there is another profile Δ maximizing AP and such that
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(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
) = Δω(t,XUΔ(t)) for t ∈ T and ω ∈ Ω
and these both sets are of positive measure.
Since Δ and Δ˜ maximize AP, we have
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
=
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω).
We have the following equalities,
AP(Δ) =
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
=
+∞∫
0
∫
Ωi
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dμi(ω)dλ(t)
(for finitely many players this fact is obvious, for a continuum of players it follows from the
Fubini theorem) and, similarly,
AP(Δ˜) =
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
=
+∞∫
0
∫
Ωi
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δ˜ω
(
t,XUΔ˜(t)
))
dμi(ω)dλ(t)
=
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
c11 · XUΔ˜(t)
)
dλ(t)
(by the definition of the profile Δ˜).
By the Jensen inequality,
AP(Δ) =
+∞∫
0
∫
Ωi
e−ξ1·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dμi(ω)dλ(t)

+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(∫
Ωi
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
)
dμi(ω)
)
dλ(t)
=
+∞∫
e−ξ1·t ln
(
UΔ
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t).0
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of positive measure.
Since the strategy defined by c11 · XUΔ˜(t) maximizes
∫ +∞
0 e
−ξ1·t ln(D(t,XD(t))) dλ(t), we
get AP(Δ)AP(Δ˜) (with strict inequality whenever UΔ˜(t,XUΔ˜(t)) = UΔ(t,XUΔ(t)) for t in a
set of positive measure).
But both profiles Δ and Δ˜ maximize aggregated payoff, which implies AP(Δ˜) = AP(Δ).
Therefore Δω(t,XUΔ(t)) = UΔ˜(t,XUΔ˜(t)) for a.e. ω and a.e. t . 
For more than one type of players, the profile Δ˜ does not have to maximize the aggregated
payoff, but we still can define a social welfare function of similar form such that Δ˜ is the only
(up to equivalence almost everywhere) profile for which the maximum is attained.
From now on, for simplicity of reasoning, we shall concentrate on fixed-rate strategies. We
shall consider the social welfare function being a weighted aggregate of payoffs.
Proposition 10. Let us consider games with i players constituting k types and the social welfare
function of the form
WAP(Δ) =
∫
Ωi
+∞∫
0
Aω · e−ξω·t ln
(
Δω
(
t,XUΔ(t)
))
dλ(t) dμi(ω)
for any positive numbers Aω such that for ω of type k Aω = Ak = (ξk)2 · A for some positive
number A. The profile Δ˜ maximizes WAP and if Δ is a profile which also maximizes WAP, then
ΔOLω (t) = Δ˜OLω (t) for a.e. t and a.e. ω.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, the proof will be for k = 2 (the proof for k > 2 follows along
the same lines). By calculations analogous to those for one type of players, we first prove that
in the class of fixed-rate profiles (i.e., such that Δω(t, x) = sω · x) such that for every type k we
have
∫
Ωi∩Ik sω dμi(ω) = μki · sk for given sk , the maximum of WAP is attained for sω = sk for
a.e. ω of type k.
Therefore the maximum of WAP is equal to maximum over the set of all possible (s1, s2) of
A1μ1i
+∞∫
0
e−ξ1·t ln
(
s1 · x¯ · e(r−s¯)·t)dλ(t) + A2μ2i
+∞∫
0
e−ξ2·t ln
(
s2 · x¯ · e(r−s¯)·t)dλ(t),
where s¯ = μ1i s1 + μ2i s2.
This sum is equal to
A1μ1i
(
ln s1
ξ1
+ ln x¯
ξ1
+ r − (μ
1
i s
1 + μ2i s2)
(ξ1)2
)
+ A2μ2i
(
ln s2
ξ2
+ ln x¯
ξ2
+ r − (μ
1
i s
1 + μ2i s2)
(ξ2)2
)
,
therefore its maximum is obtained for s1 and s2 given by the equations
A1μ1i
1 ·
1
1 = μ1i
(
A1μ1i
1 2 +
A2μ2i
2 2
)
and
A2μ2i
2 ·
1
2 = μ2i
(
A1μ1i
1 2 +
A2μ2i
2 2
)
.ξ s (ξ ) (ξ ) ξ s (ξ ) (ξ )
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sk =
Ak
ξk
A1μ1i
(ξ1)2
+ A2μ2i
(ξ2)2
.
Now we calculate for what Ak we have sk = ξk . We solve the system of equations
A1
ξ1
A1μ1i
(ξ1)2
+ A2μ2i
(ξ2)2
= ξ1 and
A2
ξ2
A1μ1i
(ξ1)2
+ A2μ2i
(ξ2)2
= ξ2.
By dividing the equations by sides we get
A1
A2
=
(
ξ1
ξ2
)2
.
Let us take Ai = (ξ i)2 ·A. Any such pair of Ai fulfills the system of equations since μ1i +μ2i = 1.
5.3. Sustainability and environmental targets
There is also another possibility for a social planner—to look for profiles which imply sustain-
ability of the ecosystem or another environmental policy target. Such profiles may be not Pareto
optimal in the dynamic game. However, they have one substantial advantage: in fact, we do not
usually know the payoff functions accurately. In such a situation every social welfare function
defined on the basis of estimates of players’ payoff functions is misleading. The mistakes may
lead to over- or under-exploitation, but there is no symmetry: more dangerous is the situation in
which we have degeneration of the ecosystem while the player would rather preserve it.
In various sustainability approaches we want the profile (in fact it is enough to concentrate
on its aggregate UΔ) to be such that for every t we have XUΔ(t)  x¯ (we want to preserve the
system at a level which is as good as at the beginning of the game) or XUΔ(t)  xmin, where
xmin is the minimal acceptable state of the system (for some reasons outside the scope of this
paper). The latter assumptions may be required for all t (usually if xmin  x¯) or only for t > t¯ (if
xmin > x¯ and we have some time to improve the state of the system to the minimal acceptable
level).
Remark 1. If ξ¯ < r 
∑K
l=1 cliμ
l
i and xmin  x¯, then in the game with i players the profile Δ˜
is sustainable (in the sense that xmin  XUΔ(t) for all t) while the equilibrium profile Δ is not
sustainable (in the sense that xmin > XUΔ(t) for some t).
6. Enforcement
Whatever is the social welfare function and whatever profile the social planner regards as
optimal, there is a problem of enforcement.
In this paper we shall consider enforcement of the profile indicated by the social planner by
a system of taxes or environmental charges. In general, there may be also compensations for the
players, who restrict their extraction more than they should according to the social planner, but
in this paper we consider only actual taxes.
A tax system is a vector of functions T k : (R+)3 → R+ for k = 1, . . . ,K , interpreted as fol-
lows: the tax paid by player ω of type k at time t and state x is a function T k(t, x, ·) of the
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off.
In this paper we shall consider so-called “linear tax” which is affine in the extraction rate
above some assumed level, i.e.,
T k(t, x, s) = τ k(x) · (s − ak(t))+,
where ak is the extraction rate assumed by the social planner. Obviously, ak  cki .
In some case, because of legal or political correctness reasons, the tax form should be inde-
pendent of k: such a tax system will be called anonymous.
These taxes are only regulatory, with no fiscal meaning, therefore the only objective is to
enforce some socially acceptable profile.
Definition 3. A tax system T enforces a profile Δ if Δ is an equilibrium in the game modified
by T .
A tax system T enforces an aggregate U if U is the aggregate of an equilibrium in the game
modified by T .
Now we shall construct a tax systems enforcing assumed fixed-rate profile Δω(t, x) = ak · x
(with ak  cki ) or assumed fixed-rate aggregate U(t, x) = a¯ · x (with a¯  cki for each type k).
The calculation of such a tax system in the case of continuum of players is really simple and
checking that they really enforce the profile is also simple.
Proposition 11. In the continuum of players game,
(a) every tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ k(x) · (s − ak)+ with τ k(x)  1
ak
enforces Δ and no such
a tax system with τ k(x) < 1
ak
for some x such that (XUΔ)−1(x) is of positive measure does
enforce Δ;
(b) every tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ(x) · (s − a¯)+ with τ(x)  1
a¯
enforces U and no such a
tax system with τ(x) < 1
a¯
for some x such that (XUΔ)−1(x) is of positive measure does
enforce U .
Proof. It is an immediate consequence of the decomposition Theorem 1 of [23] (Theorem 14 in
Appendix A): the maximum of the function ln(s · x) − T k(t, x, s) must be in ak or a¯, respec-
tively. 
The calculation of a tax system for n players game or even checking the property of enforcing
is not so simple even if we restrict to fixed-rate profiles. Fortunately some results calculated for
continuum of players can be applied.
Proposition 12. In the game with n players,
(a) every tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ k(x) · (s − ak)+ with τ k(x) 1
ak
for all x enforces Δ;
(b) every tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ(x) · (s − a¯)+ with τ(x) 1
a¯
for all x enforces U .
Proof. The instantaneous payoffs in the modified games are decreasing for s > ak (s > a¯, re-
spectively) while the regeneration function of the system is decreasing in s given any x (which
implies that the trajectory corresponding to s > ak is below the trajectory corresponding to ak).
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spectively). 
Nevertheless, these results are only necessary conditions for enforcing, while for the con-
tinuum of players we have necessary and sufficient conditions. Moreover, calculating the tax
systems for the continuum-of-players case is much simpler than the techniques that should be
used for games with finite number of players.
Proposition 13.
(a) If the profile Δω(t, x) = ak · x is such that ak  ξk , then in the game with n players every
tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ k · (s − ak)+ with constant τ k  n·ξk−ak
n·ξk ·ak enforces Δ.
(b) If the aggregate UΔ(t, x) = a¯ ·x is such that a¯  ξk for all k, then in the game with n players
every tax system T k(t, x, s) = τ k · (s − a¯)+ with constant τ k  n·ξk−a¯
n·ξk ·a¯ enforces UΔ.
Proof. (a) We start by finding player’s best response over a constrained class of strategies: fixed-
rate strategies.
We choose one player ω of type k and we assume that the aggregate of the remaining players’
strategies is equal to C · x while the rate of the specified player is s · x.
Then the payoff is equal to
+∞∫
0
e−ξkt
(
ln
(
s · Xs,C(t))− τ k · (s − ak)+)dλ(t)
=
+∞∫
0
e−ξkt
(
ln
(
s · x¯ · e(r−C− 1n s)t)− τ k · (s − ak)+)dt
= ln s + ln x¯
ξ k
+ (r − C −
1
n
· s)
(ξk)2
−
+∞∫
0
e−ξkt τ k · (s − ak)+ dt
= ln s + ln x¯
ξ k
+ (r − C −
1
n
· s)
(ξk)2
− τ
k · (s − ak)+
ξk
.
If s  ak , then the payoff is equal ln s+ln x¯
ξω
+ (r−C− 1n ·s)
(ξω)2
, which is increasing in s for s  ak
(since ak  ξk) therefore the maximum over this set will be attained at s = ak (therefore in the
maximum we will surely have s  ak).
If s  ak , we have the after-tax payoff:
ln s + ln x¯
ξ k
+ (r − C −
1
n
· s)
(ξk)2
− τ
k · (s − ak)
ξk
.
Now we calculate the optimal s  ak . We get
1
s · ξk −
1
n · (ξk)2 −
τ k
ξk
= 0.
Therefore s˜ = n·ξkk k .1+n·ξ ·τ
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take n·ξ
k
1+n·ξk ·τk  a
k
, which leads to τ k  n·ξ
k−ak
n·ξk ·ak .
The only thing to check is whether this optimum over the whole class of strategies is attained
at a fixed-rate strategy with rate ak .
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we define
V (x) = lna
k + lnx
ξk
+ (r − C −
1
n
· ak)
(ξk)2
—the optimal payoff over the fixed-rate strategies and check whether V is the value function for
our optimization.
We check the Bellman equation
ξkV (x) = sup
0sMω
ln(s · x) + V ′(x) ·
(
r − C − 1
n
· s
)
and the transversality condition limt→+∞ V (X(t)) · e−ξω·t = 0 for the trajectory corresponding
to this choice of player ω. This can be made by simple calculations as in the proof of Lemma 3.
Therefore, the only best response (up to t in a negligible set) of player ω to any fixed-rate
strategies of the remaining players is a fixed-rate strategy with the rate ak . Therefore the fixed-
rate profile in which each player of type k has the rate ak is an equilibrium in the game modified
by tax, which ends this part of the proof.
(b) Here the proof is analogous to that of (a). 
Let us note that whenever the enforced profile is a Pareto improvement of the equilibrium
profile, the payoffs after taxation for this profile are greater than for the equilibrium profile for at
least some players and at least as good for a.e. player.
Remark 2. If all players are of the same type 1, r > ξ1 and a tax system
T 1(t, x, s) = τ 1(x) · (s − ξ1)+
enforces the profile Δ˜, then the payoffs resulting from tax are Pareto optimal in the primary game,
they are Pareto improvement of the equilibrium profile Δ, they maximize aggregated payoff,
they are effective in the sense of property and the behaviour of the players leads to sustainable
exploitation of the ecosystem.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we considered games with finitely many players and their limit game with con-
tinuum of players used for modelling exploitation of a renewable resource.
The game with continuum of players turns out to be good to model real situations in which the
number of players is large. In the games considered the fixed rate equilibria in the continuum-of-
players game are the same as such equilibria in the games with a sufficiently large finite number
of players. However, the technique of calculation is much simpler for the game with a continuum
players.
In both games the equilibria are not Pareto optimal and some kind of more “socially accept-
able” behaviour of the players has to be enforced (three ways of mathematical modelling of the
term “socially acceptable” are considered). In the game with continuum of players calculating a
A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel / J. Math. Anal. Appl. 337 (2008) 840–861 859tax system enforcing socially desired behaviour is much simpler and a tax system which enforces
such a behaviour in the continuum-of-players game, enforces it also in any game with finitely
many players.
Appendix A
Here we present the necessary fragments of Theorem 1 from Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [23]
for a large class of dynamic games in which the behaviour of the ecosystem can be stochastic. The
time set is denoted by T with σ -field T and measure λ, the set of possible states of the system
is denoted by X with σ -field X and the set of trajectories X will be the set of all measurable
functions X :T → X.
The players, who constitute a continuum, denoted as the measure space (Ω,	,μ), choose
decisions from a set S with σ -field S , they have arbitrary correspondences of available static
strategies Sω : X × T S. The definitions of strategies and profiles are like in this paper. We
shall consider also static profiles available at x and t—measurable selections from the correspon-
dence S·(x, t).
Instead of simple aggregate we take a statistic function of a static profile which has the form
[∫
Ω
gi(ω, δ(ω)) dμ(ω)]mi=1 for gi :Ω × S → R measurable and integrably bounded. The set of
all T ⊗ X -measurable functions U :T × X → Rm being statistics of profiles will be denoted
by Y.
A function Φ :X ×Y × T → M1(X) with Φ(X,U, t0) being equal to the distribution con-
centrated at x0 for every control function U and every trajectory X starting from x0 is called a
function of the behaviour of the system (where the symbol M1(X) denotes the set of probability
measures on (X,X )).
To make the game realistic, we assume that the behaviour of the system at time t is defined by
the states of the system and the values of profile statistics for earlier moments only, i.e., Φ is such
that for every t , if trajectories X1, X2 coincide for s < t and control functions U1, U2 coincide
for s < t and all x, then Φ(X1,U1, t) = Φ(X2,U2, t).
Moreover, the behaviour of the system does not depend on irrelevant alternatives, only on the
actual trajectory, i.e., for every trajectory X and control functions U1, U2 such that U1(t,X(t)) =
U2(t,X(t)) for a.e. t , we have Φ(X,U1, t) = Φ(X,U2, t) for all t .
Let U ∈Y. For this U and a trajectory coinciding with X for s < t , the state of the system at
time t is chosen according to the distribution Φ(X,U, t). Every trajectory X ∈X starting from x0
and fulfilling λ({t | X(t) /∈ suppΦ(X,U, t)}) = 0 (where the symbol supp stands for the support
of a distribution), will be called corresponding to U .
Note that the system whose behaviour is described by X(0) = x0,
.
X (t) = φ(X(t),U(t,X(t)))
is a special case of the system described by the above definition.
The instantaneous payoffs are dependent on player’s own action, the statistic of static profile,
state of the system and time instant Pω :S×Rm ×X×T → R.
In such a stochastic game we consider, among others, strong Nash equilibrium—a profile such
that payoff of a.e. player is maximized along every trajectory corresponding to this profile.
The dynamic objects are in the dynamic game while the static ones in static games Gt,x with
fixed time t and state x in which each player ω chooses available actions from d ∈ Sω(x, t) and
gets instantaneous payoff Pω(d,u, x, t) where u is the statistic of the static profile chosen.
Theorem 14. (See Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel [23, Theorem 1].)
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Δ(·, t,X(t)) are for almost every t static equilibria at time t and state of the system X(t),
then Δ is a strong dynamic equilibrium.
(f) Let the space of strategies S be such that diagS is S ⊗S-measurable and S is a measurable
image of a measurable space (Z,Z) being an analytic subspace of a separable compact
topological space W (with the σ -field of Borel subsets B(W)). Assume that for a.e. ω, t and
every u, x, the function Pω(·, u, x, t) is upper semicontinuous, for a.e. ω the function Pω is
such that inverse images of measurable sets are S ⊗B(Y)⊗X ⊗ T -analytic and the corre-
spondence Sω has an X ⊗T ⊗S-analytic graph and compact values. Every strong dynamic
equilibrium Δ such that for almost every player ω and every trajectory X corresponding
to Δ the payoff Πω(Δ(ω, ·, ·),UΔ,X) is finite, fulfills the following condition: for every tra-
jectory X corresponding to Δ and for almost every t , static profiles Δ(·, t,X(t)) are static
equilibria at time t and state of the system X(t).
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